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Abstract: The study analyses developmental state in Brazil using historical and institutional 
approach within the framework of development economics. The study is in four parts. The first 
part is a brief theoretical introduction, which discusses and defines developmental state itself and 
presents the classic model of developmental state and the newer trends, characteristics of a re-
considered developmental state. These two concepts serve as a benchmark to analyse the role of 
the state in fostering socio-economic development in Brazil.  
In the next section a historical overview of the Brazilian developmental state is presented. Third 
part of the study aims to discuss the present situation in Brazil, it analyses to what extent the 
Brazilian state can be considered as developmental state and what results have been achieved. In 
the last part we draw our conclusions, and highlight some open questions.  
 
Table of contents: 1. Towards a new model of developmental state. 2. Historical overview of 
the Brazilian developmental state. 3. Desenvolvimentista state in Brazil (1930-1985) – the ISI 
developmental model. 4. Democratization and state-led governance by the market (1985-2003). 
5. Towards a Social Developmental State in Brazil (2003 – 2010). 6. Brazilian Developmental 
State on the spot. 7. Whither Brazil?  
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1. Towards a new model of developmental state. 
In this study we analyse the developmental state (DS) in Brazil using historical and institutional 
approach within the framework of development economics. To set the context first we briefly 
discuss the classic model of DS. Afterwards we describe newer trends, characteristics of a re-
considered DS of the twenty-first century in order to move towards a new model of DS. Model-
building itself however is not the aim of this study. 
Vast literature on developmental states emerged since the conceptualization of the original idea 
of Chalmers Johnson’s (1982) plan-rational capitalist developmental state, the Japanese model. 
This classic concept has been applied and expanded to other Asian, and later on European and 
emerging countries. DS has become ‘a generic term to describe governments that try to actively 
“intervene” in economic processes and direct the course of development rather than relying only 
on market forces' (Stubbs, 2009:5). To set the cornerstones of the classic model of DS, we rely 
on the work of Leftwich (1995), who mainly based his work on the Asian DS practices, but also 
extended it to the cases of Botswana and China. It identifies six main features of DS as (Leftwich, 
1995:405): 1. determined developmental elite; 2. the relative autonomy of the state; 3. a powerful, 
competent and insulated bureaucracy; 4. a weak and subordinated civil society; 5. the effective 
management of non-state economic interests; 6. and repression, legitimacy and performance.  
To re-define the role of state in development, we have to look at changes of the world economy 
and applied technologies, while also taking into account newer results of modern economic 
theory. According to Williams (2014:8) we highlight four pivotal challenges in the twenty-first 
century, which developmental states have to address. First, the challenge of global economic 
restructuring, the shift towards the so called bit-driven economy, where the engine of growth is the 
knowledge and service sector. Second, the changes in domestic policies, for a large part of the 
developing countries this means the process of democratization, but also factors as the need for 
deeper embeddedness, extended public deliberation and participation are included. Third 
challenge is the so called ideational and epistemic shift in understanding of development: the new 
paradigm of development based on Amartya Sen’s concept, the human-capabilities approach. 
Finally the ecological limits of development become more and more visible, and the surge for 
environmental justice cannot be ignored.  
For the story of economic restructuring of the twenty-first century and its implication for the 
Global South see Evans (2014: 227-231). His argumentation in a nutshell is however, that in 
most emerging and developing countries the shift from agriculture to manufacturing failed to 
produce a broad working class (blue-collar class) and to substantially increase the well-being of 
 
 
 
 
4 federalismi.it |n. 20/2014 
 
 
  
larger part of the society in the twentieth century. Furthermore in most of these countries 
globalization has destroyed more jobs in manufacturing than it has created. If we add to these 
processes the new economic structural changes, the shift toward the knowledge and service 
sectors, the picture gets even more nuanced. The service sector is namely bifurcated, and only a 
small minority of the workers has the luck (and capabilities) to get employed in the well-paying 
business and financial service sector. The majority of the workers will be engaged (if at all) in 
some kind of interpersonal service (like retail trade, education and health services), which is much 
less rewarded. Looking at the new theories of development we have to remember that expanding 
human capabilities are both means and goals of development. Through the pure market logic 
however there will always be an underinvestment in services expanding human capabilities (such 
as health and education), as their private returns are much lower than social returns, investing in 
human being is much riskier than investments in machines, and the time-horizon is also much 
longer. The only way to get investments in human capabilities closer to the socially optimal levels 
thus requires active state involvement. This is the background for the need for a re-considered 
developmental state in the twenty-first century, but the question remains what kind of 
developmental state can succeed and whether the transformation of DS is feasible at all.  
The new-type developmental state differs from the old model in its basic characteristics. The new 
DS has a central role in making development possible, but not in directly implementing it. 
Beyond traditional state functions the re-defined developmental state has to actively promote 
sustainable development in its wider sense. This means fulfilling tasks such as providing appropriate 
institutional and business environment supporting sustainable economic growth (stable macro-
environment, solid financial system, external-orientation, economic and political liberalization) 
and additionally the state has to improve other dimensions of development, which vis-à-vis also directly 
influence economic growth. As up to know he have argued that human development and 
especially enhancing human capabilities is one of the most important new tasks of a re-defined 
developmental state. Building incentives to accelerate the production of ideas and expanding 
access to existing stock of ideas has also become of central importance. We did not go into detail 
with other dimensions of development (like spatial, environmental, generational, etc.), but do 
recognize their importance as subjects for further research. 
Tasks of the state generated by different dimensions of development do overlap, as for example 
securing stable macro-economic environment does improve the situation of the poorest 
segments of the society (as shown later in the case of Brazil), however we emphasize that taking 
into account different components and dimensions of development, latest changes in global 
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economic structure and modern economic theories does indicate new or additional state interventions, 
which mainly focus on empowering and enabling people – with Sen’s words – “to lead the kind 
of lives they value and – have reason to value” (Sen, 1999:18)).  
The old-style developmental state as organizer, producer, owner and discretionary regulator aimed often 
to directly produce and create wealth, or at least directly intervene in economic processes. In 
contrast the new DS’s functions are primarily to set the rules, coordinate and control. It needs to 
intervene actively in certain areas, but types of interventions, tools and methods differ from those 
of the classic DS. A reformed state is although smaller in size, but stronger in capacities and capabilities. 
It has wider and longer scope of planning, its functioning is more professional, decentralized, 
participatory and rules-based. Implementing this shift in governance needs innovations and reforms 
in institutional and structural spheres. We have highlighted the central role of the educational and 
health subsystems, but also classic areas, as financial system, labour market, tax system and state 
administration have to be revised. We could not go into detail in several areas, rather wanted to 
demonstrate that new insights are available for building a new model of developmental state in 
the twenty-first century, and further research is inevitable for digging deeper in this topic. 
Implications for economic policy-making are still somewhat eclectic. While commitment to 
market-oriented development is strengthened, to secure more effective functioning of the market 
active state interventions are needed. To manage this transformation capacity and quality of 
government has to be improved, a state reform is inevitable. Still we emphasize that even “good” 
institutions and policies only do well in supporting social environments, thus possibilities of 
participation in setting community priorities, decision-making, self-organizing capabilities of civil 
societies are crucial.  
 
2. Historical overview of the Brazilian developmental state. 
In the next section we analyse the case of Brazil, the Brazilian Developmental State through the 
lenses of the twentieth and the twenty-first century’s developmental state models, as 
demonstrated above.  
In order to better understand the Brazilian Developmental State of today we need a historical 
overview of its evolution, as legacies of the past (such as the import substitution industrialization, 
or certain shortcomings of the democratization process) affect the present situation. This means 
that a certain path-dependency prevails, and to be able to answer the challenges of the twenty-
first century, it is inevitable to get know former practices, experiences, analyse failures and 
successes.  
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Modern economic history in Brazil has been exciting and multifaceted in political, institutional 
and economic dimensions. It is out of the scope of this paper to give a full overview of the 
economic history of Brazilian state1. We look only at the period beginning with 1930 up to date 
(2013/14). And though certain cyclicality can be observed, we will argue at the end of this paper 
also for some kind of continuance in developmentalist path, developmental state in Brazil.  
Table 1: Variations on economic policies 
Period Political cycle Applied economic policies 
1930-1985 Estado Desenvolvimentista Import substitution industrialization 
1930-37 Authoritarian regime Restricted industrialization  
1937-45 Open dictatorship (Estado Novo) 
1945-64 Populist State (restricted democracy) Structured, heavy import substitution 
industrialization (ISI), developmentalism  
1964-1985 Military Developmentist State Extended ISI, export-promotion 
1985-2002 Democratization and the 
Cardoso era 
Democratization, economic stabilization, 
opening and structural reforms 
2003-2013 Governance by Lula and 
Rousseff 
Towards a social developmental state 
Source: own construction 
 
We distinguish three phases of the last 80 years of Brazilian state-led development: 
desenvolvimentista state (1930-1985), state-led governance by the market (1985-2002), social 
developmental state (2003 – 2013/14 ).  
 
3. Desenvolvimentista state in Brazil (1930-1985) – the ISI developmental model. 
In short the story of the period between 1930-1985 is the transformation of Brazil from a mainly 
agrarian economy based on primary exports to a modern economy and society with urban and 
industrial base. While analysing this transformation one has to take into account specific 
characteristics of Brazil: huge size of the country and its population, spatial fragmentation of its 
old agro-export economy and later on its new industrial production. This economic 
transformation had resulted in social advances (albeit modest ones compared to other Latin 
American countries), overall social indicators improved as did access to basic social services, 
poverty decreased. However this forced modernization process was also contradictory and 
unbalanced. Although economic growth was strong, it concentrated mainly in the Southern, 
South-Eastern regions. Income concentration was always extremely high and persistent in Brazil. 
                                                        
1 For this see: Maddison (1992:19-110), Baer (1995:25-199), Burlamaqui et al. (2006), Baer – Fleischer 
(2011), Font (2011), Roett (2011:37-72), Ricz (2009:90-107). 
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Large parts of the society were excluded not just from the economic modernization, but also 
from political process: whether during the dictatorship of the military regimes or during the 
interplay between the two, which we can name restricted democracy. This is the complex 
context, in which we have to regard the role of the state.  
The period between 1930-1980 was the era of import-substitution industrialization – although 
with some variations of the period’s economic policy strategy – with an outstanding economic 
performance of almost 6 % GDP growth rates on average (Maddison, 2001:74). This period of 
developmentalism, as shown in Table 1, can be divided into three stages: primary, unstructured 
import substitution (IS), structured import substitution industrialization (ISI) and extended ISI 
with export promotion.  
The dictatorship of Vargas beginning with 1930 is often seen as the rise of modern Brazil, and in 
contrast to the former mainly liberal approach, the increase of state interventionism. The 
transformation of Brazil from an economy mainly based on primary exports and capital imports 
towards a more industrialized economy begun, although at the beginning more as an unintended 
by-product of economic policies (Pinheiro et al. 2001:4). Through direct and indirect state 
interventions the role of the state in economic (industrial) development increased. This hand in 
hand with heightened nationalism and central planning were in accordance with Keynesien, neo-
Keynesien policies (Peixoto, 2011:19). The economic policy of restricted import substitution is 
also regarded as the first step towards the formation of the Brazilian Developmental State.  
After 1950 conscious interventions (artificial price distortions, subsidies and regulations) 
strengthened the disproportional growth of the industrial sector, with emphasis on heavy 
industry and consumer durables. High growth rates of this period were however made possible 
by specific internal factors (authoritarian political regime, general belief in and support for 
developmentalism) and maybe even more important by external possibilities (abundant credit in the 
world market). The role of the state was further strengthened under the era of Kubitschek, the so 
called “golden age” of developmentalism as shown by the Plano de Metas (1955-60). Starting with 
1958 however accelerating inflation, sharp decline in growth rates and deep political crises led to 
military coup in 1964. The military dictatorship thereafter continued and even strengthened 
developmental strategies. After an initial period of economic stabilization, economic growth rates 
were resumed at even higher rates and Brazil entered to the so called economic miracle period from 
1968 to the mid 1970s (with average annual growth rates of GDP 11,3 between 1968-73 (Roett, 
2011:61)). Due to deteriorating international conditions and domestic imbalances economic 
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growth decreased gradually, and with the country’s slide in to the debt crisis at the beginning of 
1980s, it turned into negative rates.  
During the first half of 1980s stagnating economy and high unemployment rates inherently 
showed the failures of the ISI model: financial vulnerability and distributive shortcomings. Heavy 
emphasis on income transfers towards domestic economic groups (to promote industrial 
production), neglecting chronic social needs and repressing political resistance of lower classes of 
the society (mainly urban and rural workers) was made possible by the authoritarian regime. This 
led to perpetuate “traditionally” extreme high levels of income inequalities, which is seen as a by-
product of Brazilian-style development. By this time it became obvious that nor the Keynesian, 
neither the developmentalist path could lead Brazil to catch up with more developed countries.  
Deep economic recession accompanied by these social processes indirectly forged the 
democratization of Brazil, and the beginning of a new phase. Before looking at the period 
beginning with 1985, we try to set cornerstones of the Brazilian model of developmental state. 
It is often argued in the literature that in the transition process of latecomers like Brazil (also called 
capitalism tardio countries2), the state has played a strong and decisive role. This leadership implies 
besides an ideological background, building the material and financial basis, but also confronting 
the social questions. The movement of large masses of peasants into urban market economies 
within a short period of time led to the emergence of several social tensions, (e.g. informal 
employment and housing, emergence of favelas in larger cities). Social policies within the period 
1930-85 were not solely an answer to these tensions, but also served to raise the regime’s political 
legitimacy. Looking at the Varguista strategy, we can see that it aimed the social integration of the 
urban wage and salaried workers. Other parts of the society, mainly peasants and rural workers 
constituted the “forgotten class” of this era. Draibe (2007:242) dates to this period the building 
of the Brazilian Developmental Welfare State (BDWS). She admits however that the evolution of 
the social protection system mainly concerned capital and labour relationship. Thiscorporatist or 
conservative type welfare system was organized around three pillars: the universal public provision; 
contributory and subsidized programmes; private sector services. Basis of social institutions (such 
as right to regulated jobs, labour unions and minimum wage regulation, social protection system), 
however limited and partial, were laid down in Brazil, and this is a merit of this period. 
Incomplete and insufficient as these “modern” institutions were they constitute the historical 
legacies which any future Brazilian (developmental) state has to cope with. Many shortcomings 
                                                        
2 First reference: Cardoso de Mello (1982). 
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(such as clientelism and patronage) of the system today (though several reforms since then) can 
be rooted back to this era.  
In contrast to these more pessimistic views, Boschi (2011:42) highlights positive continuities 
within the institutional trajectory of Brazil, rooted in the first Vargas administration: namely the 
corporatist structure of business interest representation and the labour legislation.  
Another important feature of the late transition process is especially true for the case of Brazil: 
the state played a decisive role in coordinating and providing incentives to the market, and also it 
became a capitalist producer with strong presence in strategic sectors of the economy. 
According to Schneider (1999: 278-280) we highlight four elements of desarrollista state or the so 
called ISI developmental model in Brazil in the period from 1930 until 1980. First political capitalism, 
where profits and investments depended on decisions made by the state. Second economic 
growth enabled by state interventions and promoted through industrialization and import-substitution. 
Third political exclusion which is not necessarily limited to authoritarian regimes, as during the 
democratic period 1945-64 in Brazil literacy requirements excluded a majority of adults from 
political participation. Fourth fluid, weakly institutionalized bureaucracy, in which appointments 
structured power and representation. Schneider (ibid) emphasizes however the systemic 
interaction of this four components of desarrollista state, as these affect and often reinforce each 
other.  
Main difference in this institutional approach between the East-Asian and Latin-American DS, 
especially the Brazilian DS is the dysfunctionality of the appointive bureaucracy, or more concretely the 
career patterns within the executive bureaucracy, and thus its consequences (such as low 
performance, job-insecurity and thus the lack of “embedded autonomy” using Evans’ term). 
Another main differing feature however is, that in Brazil non-state economic interests were not 
effectively managed, this means that large land-owners and private capitalists were able to capture 
the state, which thus could not effectively implement top-down structural transition. Finally we 
highlight two main characteristics of the Brazilian DS within this period, which will be essential 
by looking at the transition towards the twenty-first century type DS: it was exclusionary as 
regarding civil society and discretionary interventionist towards the economy.  
To sum up we conclude, that although named developmental state, the Brazilian model differs 
substantially from the classis-type DS, and despite being “successful” (due to special internal and 
external conditions), it was not sustainable model neither financially, economically, nor socially or 
politically.  
 
 
 
 
 
10 federalismi.it |n. 20/2014 
 
 
  
4. Democratization and state-led governance by the market (1985-2003). 
The failure of the desenvolvimentista model led to the loss of political legitimacy of military rule and 
the democratization process in Brazil starter with inherent changes in social, political and economic 
spheres.  
During the years and decades after the debt crisis, most economic policy interventions aimed at 
economic stabilization: chronic fiscal imbalances and hyperinflation were the two main challenges. 
High inflation was an inherent feature of the Brazilian economy. Lasting operation of the 
economy under high and persistent inflation was made possible by institutional solutions 
(indexation mechanism), however counterproductive ones (Burlamaqui et al, 2006:13). 
Accelerating inflation threatened to destroy the economy, while social unrest has risen and 
endangered political stability. Between 1985 and 1994 the Brazilian economy was subject to six 
heterodox stabilisation plans3. The common element of all these plans was the use of price 
controls and currency reform to abruptly reduce inertial inflation to one-digit levels. After all the 
way towards less state intervention and more market-friendly economic policies was paved. 
In this turbulent and exciting times of the Brazilian history, the restoration of civil and political 
rights and democratic elections led new patterns of social demands (besides higher salaries, 
adequate housing, education, health and social security –better social protection) resulting in 
extraordinary growth of civil society (increased number of social organizations), and also to new 
forms of political behaviour4 (Draibe, 2007:261).  
Table 2: Main features and cycles of Brazilian government (1985-2003) 
Period Cycles of Government Features 
1985-90 José Sarney 
Cycle of 
democratization 
New Republic, New Constitution, 
failure of economic stabilization 
1990-92 Fernando Collor de 
Mello 
Neoliberal, structural economic 
reforms 
1992-95 Itamar Franco Real Plan, stabilization, statism, 
economic nationalism, corruption 
1995-2002 Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso 
Cycle of 
liberalization 
Real Plan, economic stabilization, 
market-friendly reforms, 
                                                        
3 The Cruzado plan of 1986; the Bresser plan of 1987; the ‘Summer’ plan of 1989; the Collor I plan of 
1990 and the Collor II plan of 1991; and the Real plan of 1994. 
4 The latter led to new unionism (of which Lula has been an outstanding leader since 1970s) based on 
independence or autonomy towards the state. 
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pragmatism 
Source: Own construction based on Peixoto (2011:15) and Draibe (2007:265) 
First intrinsic momentum of this period was the New Constitution of 1988 being a result of long-
repressed social and political demands of masses. It guaranteed wide-ranging social rights, 
democratized public policies on a decentralized and participatory way. Several innovations of the 
social agenda were introduced by the new constitution, such as the comprehensive social protection 
system (e.g. reinforcement of universal entitlements in health policy; expansion of social rights to 
new groups, mainly rural workers). Without compromising its progressivity and the shift towards 
a more inclusive model, after the legislative euphoria new tensions came to light (Kerstenetzky, 
2014:174): social rights and public responsibilities were laid down in great, however insufficient 
detail (leaving space for discretion and imperfections in realisation and implementation). To these 
tensions we have to add, that expectations were curbed high not only by the new social pact, but 
also by the failure of Sarney and Collor de Mello to stabilize the economy after the debt and fiscal 
crises of the 1980s and early 1990s. They have not only failed on the economic front, but also 
failed to relieve urging social tensions: social spending was cut, income distribution worsened and 
social indicators stagnated. Itamar Franco’s economy minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
managed to get under control the inflation and stabilize the economy with the so called Real Plan 
in 1994, a success which helped him to defeat Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the presidential 
elections in 1995.  
After this “short” interplay of political and economic stabilization, a new era started, which is 
often called the state-led governance by the market (Kerstenetzky, 2014:175) and lasted from 1995 until 
2003.  
The Cardoso era is often called the period of re-democratization (Arbache, 2004:13), a relative stable 
political term free of corruption scandals, characterized by unified consensus in politics and 
backed by economic stabilization. Changes in policies, structural and institutional reforms, and as 
a result of these, incoming foreign direct investments made it possible to get out of the crises. 
Finally we can state that Brazil broke up with developmentalism and the dirigiste approach.  
With the ideological background of the neoliberalism, most important cornerstones of the 
market-oriented transition of Brazil, were besides economic stabilization, structural reforms as 
well-known from the Washington Consensus: liberalization, privatization and deregulation. 
The evaluation of Brazil privatization is overwhelmingly negative in economic literature (see for 
example Baer-Bang, 2002). As it is often the case, driving forces of privatization were ultimately 
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to generate fiscal revenues, substantially reduce public debt and consolidate price stability (instead 
of increasing efficiency or competitiveness).  
Until the end of the 1980s Brazil was one of the most protected and closed economies of the 
world. Trade liberalization began in 1988 with some modest tariff reduction and the lifting of some 
redundant barriers. Major break with the ISI protectionism, a drastic trade liberalization cycle 
took place between 1990-93, when most of the complex and bureaucratic non-tariff barriers had 
been removed, and a new tariff structure was imposed. First steps towards South-American 
regional integration were also made: after the trade agreement between Brazil and Argentina in 
1988, with the accession of Uruguay and Paraguay, the Common Market of the South (Mercosul) 
was founded in 1991. 
First steps towards deregulation of markets were introduced in 1990 to stimulate competition and 
strengthen the role of market. Numerous restrictive rules and laws were removed, price controls 
and restrictions to entry were eliminated (especially in manufacturing and service sectors), anti-
trust legislation was strengthened, consumer protection law and new legislation on the protection 
of intellectual property rights were put in force. Several constitutional amendments were 
approved to eliminate discrimination against foreign capital, and to discontinue public monopoly 
rights in oil exploration, gas, electricity, telecommunications, infrastructure, among other sectors. 
By the end of 1990s FDI flows increased significantly into Brazil, although according to Pinheiro 
et al. (2001:23) deregulation was only a necessary condition for this. Macroeconomic stabilization, 
the restoration of market confidence and favourable international context as well as the already 
mentioned regional integration process (Mercosul) also played important role. 
Before 1994 (the Real Plan) main characteristics of Brazil governance were discretionary ruling, 
laxity in fiscal and monetary policies. Afterwards however political and social consensus emerged, that 
price stability has to be the first economic priority. The way towards rules-based fiscal policies was 
paved, and in 1998 it became legislated (Goldfajn – Refinetti Guardia, 2004:120).  
Though deteriorating balance of payments and the threat of a new crisis economic stabilization 
yielded for Cardoso the re-election in 1998. After the Brazilian currency crisis in 1999, inflation 
targeting, restrictive fiscal policies and a more investor friendly macro-economic environment 
could have led to some optimism. The indebtedness of the country and the stagnant economy in 
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general, and more specifically the Argentine crisis in 2001, and pessimistic expectations prior to 
the elections in 20025 led again to balance of payments crisis (Bresser-Pereira, 2006:8). 
Implicit in the neoliberal model of development was the idea, that the same policies that aimed at 
economic stabilization, would serve social and in wider sense human development at the same 
time. As Arbache shows (2004:33) the Real Plan and the elimination of inflation did mean a one-
time real income increase for the lower income groups, and thus these changes had an immediate 
positive impact on poverty, but only a very small impact on inequality. Draibe (2007:265-266) 
speaks about a social liberal cycle referring to the Cardoso years, and highlights three broad areas, 
which continued the affirmation of social rights as started in the preceding decade: universal public 
social services; new working, employment and income programmes; and the programme against 
poverty. Evaluation of these steps is still subject to disagreement, but in the light of the 
democratization cycle, decentralization trends, more participatory character of the political 
system, and certain steps towards a more inclusive model can be observed.  
In general under the Cardoso years low growth rates prevailed, and only modest advances in 
income distribution and poverty rates were reached. There is still agreement in the literature, that 
market-oriented reforms have laid the groundwork for putting the economy on sustainable growth 
trajectory (de Mello, 2013:295). We refer to this period as state-led governance by the market. With the 
delegation of the state’s leading role to market forces in Brazil, and the troubles to stabilize the 
currency and economy, the public agenda was shaped by the fear of losing market confidence. 
Though this was the era of neoliberal reforms and “de-statization”, the traditionally oversized 
state and its widespread interventions still characterized many areas of the Brazilian economy. 
Further critics of this period concern: the dysfunctionality of the labour market (informal sector’s 
high and increasing share), persistent concentration of land ownership, selective access to capital, 
credit and quality education. Though unquestionable results in the area of democratization heavy 
critics affect the system of political representation and the unfinished state reform. The neglect of 
social issues is also at the heart of critics, as Brazil has one of the most unequal societies of the 
world. With Kerstenetzky (2014:175) words under the Cardoso era economic stabilization “became 
not a step to the development objective but the development objective itself”.  
 
5. Towards a Social Developmental State in Brazil (2003 – 2010). 
                                                        
5 The threat felt by creditors and investors that a left-wing candidate of Workers’ Party, Lula would likely 
to be elected for president. 
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The failure to resume economic growth, the rise in unemployment and the fall in incomes of the 
middle classes during the second government of Cardoso were probably the main factors leading 
to the overwhelming victory of Lula in 2002. He took office under stormy circumstances in 
January 2003: the context of external crisis, low growth and uncertain domestic political arena all 
led to speculative attack on real, and its devaluation. The first Lula government has had thus first 
to restore the confidence of the markets, and continued (in contrast to all expectations) with the 
economic policies of his predecessor concentrating on the fight against inflation and public 
indebtedness. At the same time being a left-wing candidate he immediately showed his 
commitment to social issues. The reform of social security in 2003 has mainly continued the 
reforms of Cardoso from 1998, but concentrated on issues left out by then (such as restrictions 
on public functionaries and the introduction of compulsory contributions of retirees) (Draibe, 
2007:276). Further institutional reforms and the unification of the federal cash transfer programmes (Bolsa 
Família) were however steps towards more inclusive, socially-oriented policies. Regarding the 
first term of Lula governance, we claim that it was rather dominated by the focus on economic 
issues, and (also due to more favourable international circumstances) economic indicators started 
to improve from 2004.  
Economic successes went hand in hand with social results: this is called redistributive or inclusive 
growth. GDP per capita growth rates were higher in the poorer quantiles of the population, than 
in the richer groups. Unemployment rates declined, formal employment and average earnings 
increased. Income inequality (also its spatial dimension) and poverty declined. Partly these results 
can be explained by friendly international context, however there seems to emerge agreement 
also on positive effects of public policies.  
Beginning with 2007 the re-elected Lula was already in the position to be able to concentrate 
more on social development issues. This together with the adoption of emergency anticyclical 
policies in the face of the crisis of 2008 has led to a so called internal market alternative to 
circumvent bottlenecks of growth and employment (Boschi, 2011:37). Brazil was not drastically 
affected by the crisis, and also recovery was much quicker than in other countries. This is mostly 
explained by successful economic policies of social incorporation and domestic market expansion 
prior the crisis and anti-cyclical measures after it.  
During the second term Lula continued to prioritize monetary stabilization as the first step of 
development agenda. Domestic demand was largely stimulated by government’s measures, such as 
expansion of social programmes, credit incentive policies, labour market policies, growing government 
expenditures (new public investment plan – Growth Acceleration Programme). However an 
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ideational shift in the development discourse has also taken place in Brazil. Boschi (2011:37) calls it 
the “revival of state developmentalism”, although re-defined and re-adopted to new times. It can also 
be regarded as the move towards a social developmental state. The application of new development 
paradigm in public policies can be observed, such as the emphasis on capability-enhancing 
measures incorporated in constitutional amendments (additional funding for educational 
purposes, making education compulsory for 4 to 17 year-olds; expanding the reach of the social 
security system, etc.). 
Three elements of the new social developmental agenda can be highlighted (Kerstenetzky, 
2014:182-183): the social-economic interaction in the development trajectory; the agenda for the 
state, such as interaction between the government and civil society and between government and 
political system; and as third element environmental and agrarian dimensions of development.  
The first pillar of the new agenda contained not only the already mentioned consolidation of 
federal cash-transfer programmes to the poor (Programa Bolsa Família – PBF), but also doubling its 
coverage and increasing its benefits. With a low share of total benefit of the Brazil’s GDP 
(slightly more than 0.4 per cent) and also constituting to a small proportion of households 
incomes (slightly less than 0.7 per cent) (Soares, 2012:7) the effect of the programme in reducing 
income inequality and extreme poverty is widely accepted. This type of social programmes 
(though some certainly justifiable critics6) are in line with the Senian approach.  
Labour market interventions are another element of Lula’s new social agenda: the minimum wage 
revaluation policy (that led to steady increase in real minimum wages with the aim to restore its 
purchasing power) and incentives for formalization of employment (such as tax simplifications, 
closer monitoring of existing employment) led to more formal jobs and higher earnings.  
The introduction of the infrastructure plan called Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC) investment 
programme has also some innovative elements: public-private partnerships (encouraged by tax 
relief and access to credit); involvement of social infrastructure (such as low-cost housing, 
sanitation, urban transport, etc.); decentralized management.  
Looking at the agenda for the state two aspects are here to be highlighted: first, steps towards the 
re-professionalization of the public sector and reforming the revenue collection in order to restore government 
capacities; and second, the improvements in participation in decision-making and democratic deliberation. 
Although basic elements of these latter were laid down in the New Constitution of 1988, and first 
                                                        
6 Besides being insufficient to lift recipients out of poverty, and still excluding a lot eligible poor people, 
most critic imply that it could lead to the increase of patronage and induce a certain dependence on 
government handouts. For more details see e.g. Lindert et al. (2007) or Hall (2008). 
 
 
 
 
16 federalismi.it |n. 20/2014 
 
 
  
initiatives started under the era of Cardoso, practices of participation improved under the Lula 
administration and responsiveness of public policies has risen. Still there is place for critics: 
questions of capacity building connected with decentralization and subsidiarity and in more 
general terms deviations of legal principles and their implementation practices are mostly 
highlighted (see e.g. Zimmermann, 2014).  
It is out of our scope to examine in detail environmental and agrarian dimensions of Lula’s policies. In 
the context of the new development paradigm it is inevitable to make a note also on this topic: it 
is without any question, that responsibility of the government for issues such as deforestation has 
been raised, some other policies, such as the implementation of the PAC might have 
contradictory effects. The same prevails for agrarian issues, were the reform process hardly 
moves ahead, and land concentration remains an urging issue in Brazil. 
All in all, Lula’s governance (especially his second term) is mostly cited as a significant step 
towards a more inclusive model of development, and the revival of a re-considered developmental state. Though 
its successes, some traditional shortcomings prevail in Lula’s developmental state, as “never-
ending stories” of political (Schneider, 2011:129) and state reform (Peixoto, 2011:33).  
Boschi (2011:37) argues, that reforms under the Lula administration took place in a way, that 
lines of continuity dating back to the previous developmentalist model (such as before the era of 
market-oriented reforms) were kept. He highlights the preservation of a strategic bureaucratic 
nuclei and patterns of business relations, and regards these as constituting comparative 
institutional advantages in the era of post neoliberal globalization. In contrast to the emphasis 
placed on “path dependency”, recent debates have stressed the importance of corrections of 
previous trajectories. Boschi (2011:40) highlights the expansion of social frontier as the trademark 
of the new Brazilian Developmental State and its contribution to the Brazilian productive regime 
that is a combination of inward expansion and outward-oriented global competition.  
 
6. Brazilian Developmental State on the spot. 
Lula ended his second term of governance in 2010, with an unprecedented level of popularity7, 
and was able to choose Dilma Rousseff to replace him. After taking office in January 2011 
Rousseff demonstrated to continue the path paved by Lula, but with an even stronger 
commitment to the social developmentalist approach. Soon after inauguration she pledged to end 
                                                        
7 Not without any reason: the economy grew by 7.5% in 2010, its strongest performance in a quarter-
century. Additionally Brazil was awarded both next year’s football World Cup and the summer 2016 
Olympics Games.  
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extreme poverty and set priorities in fields of education, health, gender equality and political 
reform. The Plan Brazil Without Extreme Poverty (Plano Brasil Sem Miséria) of 2011 aimed to lift 16 
million Brazilians out of extreme poverty by 2014. With a set of elements called productive inclusion, 
it aimed to promote the access of the poor to vocational training courses, labour intermediation 
services and microcredit (WB, 2013). However Rousseff also moved towards more interventionism, 
measures introduced mainly on ad hoc basis, discretionary type interventions in the economy 
prevailed (particularly in the energy sector). She aimed to upgrade Brazil’s logistics infrastructure 
(seen as major bottleneck to economic development) through private-sector concessions, but 
several adjustments had to be made before adequate returns were offered to investors, and this 
led to delays in many projects. 
Though it is too early to evaluate policies of the Rousseff government, less favourable 
international context (the prolongation of the 2008 international crisis) and internal policy 
choices have led to definitively less growth since 2011 and forecasts are not substantially better 
(WDI, 2014). Economic growth in the first two quarters of 2014 showed negative digits, which is 
called technical recession, and this has put Brazil onto the fore in the international media. This is 
often explained (mainly by the government side) by temporary factors, like extra public holidays 
during the football world cup in June 2014, and political instability prior the election in October 
2014 (Economist, 2014). Without doubt external factors also play a role: weaker economic 
outlook for China, and Argentina's recession. Economists however tend to agree that the 
Brazilian economy struggles in recovering economic growth mainly due to the deeper causes: 
weaknesses in macroeconomic policy framework; fiscal laxity and excessive rely on expansion of 
domestic demand; discretionary interventionist policies (e.g. artificial repression of petrol prices 
and energy tarrifs to dampen inflation, special taxes on certain industries); failure to address 
chronic problems such as deficiencies of infrastructure; underperforming state administration; 
rigid labour market regulations and last but not least the complex and “burdensome” tax system. 
Due to all these factors business confidence is at lows last seen in 2008-9 crisis (EIU, 2014). This, 
hand in hand with social protests (as of in in June 2013 and during the football world cup) signal 
the failure of Rousseff administration to keep Brazil on the development path paved by Lula, and 
time will show, whether she gets a second chance to do this.  
 
7. Whither Brazil?  
We have analysed different cycles of applied development models in the last 80 years in Brazil. 
While describing the evolutionary path of the Brazilian Developmental State, we showed its 
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cyclicality but also argued in line with Boschi (2011) for the continuity of developmentalist 
institutional settings. Under the shadow of social exclusion and extreme income concentration 
tracing back to the ISI model (and prior), the New Constitution of 1988 paved the way towards 
the affirmation of wide-ranging social rights, and on the groundwork made possible by market-
oriented reforms in 1990s, a step by step a shift towards a socially more sensible, re-considered 
developmental state can be observed.  
Besides the prioritization of poverty reduction and social inclusion, the new Brazilian 
development model is characterized by domestic market expansion on the basis of sound 
macroeconomic policies (as inherited and maintained from the Cardoso era), which went hand in 
hand with strong orientation towards regional integration and diversification of export portfolio 
towards foreign markets. Under Lula this economic strategy seemed to be successful even in the 
wake of the 2008-9 crisis.  
Recent trends however show the fragility of achieved results and highlight some limitations of 
the Brazilian model, or at least some “traditional” shortcomings which came to light under the 
Rousseff administration (as discussed in the previous section). Here we highlight two of these: 
the need for macroeconomic adjustment and improving the quality of human capital by closing 
the gap between educational attainment and performance.  
Finally, in line with recent economic theories, the Brazilian case, especially contrasting the Lula 
and Rousseff administrations shows that politics can make a difference. Or with Draibe 
(2007:268) words: “historical opportunities may be lost, over omissions or bad choices”. The case 
of Brazil at the present is extremely exciting as the window of opportunity is still open. 
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